Decision processes among couples depend on the balance of power between husband and wife, which determines the welfare of household members as well as household outcomes. However, little is known about what constitutes decision power. Using self-assessments of partners' say from the Mexican Health and Aging Study in 2003, we model balance of power as an outcome stemming from both partners' demographic, socioeconomic, and health characteristics as well as their interactions. Explicitly incorporating interactions is crucial, as both absolute status and relative position in the couple ought to affect balance of power in marriage. Hence, we advance a semiparametric double index model with an index for each spouse that incorporates the above two aspects. The resulting empowerment indices of husband and wife display complex interactions. Partners are most likely to report "equal say" if both have either high or low empowerment indices, whereas the partner with a higher rank in the empowerment distribution dominates otherwise. The determinants of the indices are asymmetric by gender: Education, income and working for pay are associated with higher levels of empowerment, but more intensively for women. Poor health weakens only male empowerment. Moreover, women tend to have somewhat more say in cities than in rural areas.
Introduction
Since the 1980s, economists have tried to unravel the decision-process within the household. The interest mainly rose because of concerns that the individual welfare of household members might deviate substantially from average household welfare, especially that of children. Furthermore, some empirical studies have looked at ways to improve the position of disadvantaged household members by altering their relative income share via financial transfers. In consequence, new models of household decision-making have been developed. They posit that household members bargain over household outcomes. Decision power in these negotiations is defined by the partners' outside options, i.e. the "utility level which is guaranteed to the individual if no agreement is achieved" (Manser and Brown 1980) . These in turn are functions of each partner's control over household resources, the prices they face, and other characteristics that increase their earnings potential, remarriage probability etc. As such, factors like age and education, for example, may play a vital role in defining one's well-being in case of a bargaining breakdown. Identifying which individual characteristics are the driving forces behind decision power could help addressing inequality within households, design targeted policies to promote gender empowerment as well as fuel our understanding of intra-household decision-making. However, due to the lack of direct measures of decision power, this issue has not received much attention in the literature. The main contribution of this paper is that we found such a measure which allows us to analyze a broad set of potential determinants of overall decision power. Our main survey instrument is a general self-assessment of say in important family decisions. It is valuable for two main reasons: First, self-assessments have been shown to contain valuable information that compares well to the outcomes of more objective questions in various contexts. Second, we consider the formulation of the question as unique, because it does not ask about decision weights in specific decisions. Instead, the question rather broadly asks about say in important family decisions. Hence, it aims at the overall balance of power of husband and wife rather than referring to distinct preferences resulting from a specific sphere of decision-making. The second innovative feature of this paper is the applied estimation strategy. Analyzing the determinants of intra-household decision-making involves modelling the interactions of -in our case-two people with individual characteristics. Since economic theory does not tell us much about the determinants of decision power and the role of absolute levels of the partners' characteristics versus their relative levels, we chose an estimation technique which allows for flexible interactions of the spouses' characteristics. Semiparametric multiple index models are especially suited for the analysis of decisions involving multiple decision-makers. Hence, we introduce this recent technique into the intra-household literature and estimate a double-index model, adapted for ordered responses. Using the Mexican Health and Aging Study from 2003, we exploit direct self-assessments of the distribution of decision power within the household. Our findings point to highly complex interactions between the spouses' characteristics in determining decision power, thus emphasizing the usefulness of the semiparametric estimation technique. According to our analysis, the most important driving force of decision power are female education and male health status. Both affect female decision power positively and to a substantial degree. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the theoretical and empirical literature on intra-household allocation and household bargaining, further motivates this paper and specifies its contribution. The data is delineated in Section 3, followed by a description of the innovative estimation strategy in Section 4. The results of our empirical analysis are recorded in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Literature review

Unitary versus collective model of household behaviour
Only in the 1980s, economists have become interested in the decision processes taking part in households. Until then, researchers treated household decisions as if they were individual decisions. In this so-called unitary model, two household members (here: A and B) make decisions according to one household utility function
which aggregates the individual utilities over consumption of the private good q and the public good Q using a weighting functionW . The weights attached to each member's preferences are fixed. Targeting benefits to one person is useless in this model, as income is pooled within the household. In the 1980s, Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) pioneered modeling household decisions as a bargaining process between partners and have triggered the evolution of new types of household decision models, namely cooperative, e.g. Blundell et al. (2002) and Blundell et al. (2005) , and non-cooperative models, e.g. Lundberg and Pollak (1993) and . In cooperative (or collective) models, i.e. when pareto-efficient household outcomes are assumed, each member of the household maximises his utility subject to the common budget constraint and a given utility level of the partner. This optimisation problem can be rewritten as:
1 For a detailed discussion see Browning, Chiappori, and Weiss (2007) .
3 where the Pareto weights µ A and µ B are normalized to sum up to one. The difference between the unitary and the collective model lies in the characterization of these weights. While they are fixed in the unitary model, they can be a function
of prices p for the private and P for the public good, income x and individual characteristics z in the collective model. The individual characteristics are also called distribution factors because they-unlike prices and income-just affect the distribution of resources within the family, but have no impact on the budget constraint or on preferences (Browning, Chiappori, and Weiss 2007) . The Pareto weights µ can be interpreted as the decision power of the partners. A higher µ means that the person is more decisive in the household and enjoys better outcomes, e.g. gets a higher share of household consumption.
Preferences and decision power
In non-cooperative bargaining models, the role of gender identities respectively gender-specific preferences in household-level decision-making has been stressed (Lundberg and Pollak 1993) . Such preferences can lead to the existence of separate spheres.
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Instead of divorcing, partners live in a non-cooperative marriage and contribute to different public goods, their separate spheres. Hence, the overall decision space is separated into spheres of each partner, e.g. child care versus household equipment. The separate spheres case illustrates that the individual influence on household outcomes may differ by the type of outcome under consideration. This is also possible in a cooperative setting. Individual preferences in combination with the underlying balance of power determine specific decisions. Taking the example of reproductive health services, "If a woman and her partner differ in the extent to which they value reproductive health services, ... the outcome [will reflect] each person's perception of the services relative to their costs and the relative power of the individual in asserting his or her own preferences in decision-making" (Beegle et al., 2001, p.130) . Hence, when asking about specific areas of decision-making i a survey, the answers will likely be a combined statement of preferences and underlying decision-power. Therefore, the answer does no tell us much about decision-making on another issue, because we cannot disentangle preferences and decision power. The Pareto weights in equation (2), which are measuring decision power, do not contain any preference parameters. We take this theoretical notion of decision power literally and examine one measure of underlying decision power for all decision situations. It is a self-assessment of say in all important family decisions.
The question is not framed or targeted to any special type of decision that is to be made, so we expect that the answers are void of any individual preference parameters and just capture decision power. In this sense, our measure is much more far-reaching than any question on say in a specific household issue.
Empirical studies on intra-household allocation
Due to the lack of direct measures of decision power, empirical studies on intrahousehold bargaining have usually exploited natural experiments in which the balance of power is shifted exogenously, e.g. in the form of a public transfer paid out to one household member. This individual change in control over resources within the household is then related to household outcomes, in particular spending behaviour. By identifying spending items that are private goods for the household members, it is possible to identify whether these changes in decision power affect household outcomes over and above the pure income effect of the transfer. By assuming that household members have a strong preference for their own private consumption, the identification problem that household decisions are the outcome of preferences and decision power of the partners is mitigated. The main focus is on the well-being of children and the resources devoted to them (Kooreman 2000; Lundberg et al. 1997; Phipps and Burton 1998; Thomas 1990 ). Increases in the wife's relative to the man's income increase expenditures on children-specific goods like child care and children's clothing, lead to a sizeable increase in child health and child nutrition and reduced expenditures on alcohol and tobacco (Hoddinott and Haddad 1995; Thomas 1990; Haddad and Hoddinott 1994) .
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Other examples of outcomes include studies about the impact of women's power on fertility and contraceptive use (Balk 1997; Beegle et al. 2001; Duflo 2003; Schuler and Hashemi 1994; Schultz 1990) , the intra-household division of housework (Bittman et al. 2003; Hank and Jürges 2007; Thompson and Walker 1989; Thompson 1993) , and recently financial decision-making and savings behavior (Alessie et al. 2006; Lundberg et al. 2003) , charitable giving and informal care-giving (Andreoni et al. 2003; Pezzin and Steinberg Schone 1999) . Two observations are worth pointing out: Firstly, the impact of an exogenous shift in the balance of power is not identical for different household outcomes. This points to the relevance of heterogeneous preferences. Secondly, these studies have mostly relied on investigating the observable effect of changes in income shares. By doing so, they have necessarily neglected other factors that influence intra-household bargaining. Hence, while the literature has shown that the unitary model is widely rejected, it has offered little guidance as to what determines bargaining power. One exception is Beegle et al. (2001) who emphasize the multidimensionality of the determinants of decision power, and stress the role of social and cultural factors like age, education, and the general social status of women in society. The second exception is Friedberg and Webb (2006) . They analyze the determinants of the allocation of power and its role in affecting financial decisions like stock market investment and total wealth accumulation, using the US Health and Retirement Survey (HRS). The authors use a simple Probit technique and thus do not allow for flexible interactions of the partners' characteristics as we do. The crucial difference to our paper, however, lies in the framing of the survey question: While the question on say in the household is very open and general in our data, it is framed towards retirement and spending on major items in the HRS
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. Hence, Beegle et al. (2001) as well as Friedberg and Webb (2006) analyze questions on decision power in a specific area. The result is a composite measure of decision power and item-specific preferences of the partners which cannot be disentangled. This paper contributes to the literature by introducing two novel features: First, we use direct, subjective information on the distribution of say as measure of decision power. We are not focusing on the impact of decision power, but rather on enhancing knowledge about the driving forces behind the balance of power. This paper is furthermore deviating from the literature in that it uses a general measure of the allocation of decision power rather than focusing on specific decision situations in which we cannot a priori distinguish between preference heterogeneity and differences in decision power.
Data
We use data from the 2003 wave of the Mexican Health and Aging Study (MHAS). The MHAS is a nationally representative sample of the Mexican population aged 50+ and their spouses not living in institutions. The survey is similar in its design and topics to the US Health and Retirement Study. It contains extensive information on family and social relations, demographics, and health status as well as childhood conditions, intergenerational transfers, income and wealth, living conditions and anthropometric measures. We restrict the sample to couple households, such that we observe roughly 3500 couples. Table 1 gives a summary of the sample means and variables used in the analysis.
The measure of decision power
Among the measures of family relations is our survey instrument, a self-assessment of each partner's decision power in the household. The question asked is: "When making important family decisions, who has more weight in the decision -you or your spouse?" As a follow-up, those respondents who stated that they or their partner had more say were asked: "Would you say that you/your spouse have/has much more say in decision-making or somewhat more?" We combine the information from these two questions and define our measure of self-assessed decision power to be a discrete variable taking on five possible values: 1 meaning that the wife has much more say in the household and 5 being the other extreme that the husband has much more say. The survey question that we use is a self-report. Both partners are asked separately about their assessment of decision power. Interviewers are asked to ensure the privacy of the respondent and they are supposed to stress the confidentiality of the questions and ask others to move to another room (INEGI 2003) . Table 2 shows the distribution of intra-household decision power according to husbands' and wives' self-assessments. The most salient observation is the high concentration of households stating that they have equal say which ranges above 57 per cent independent of who answers. Furthermore, as expected, men have 6 The complete coding of the variable is: 1=wife has much more say,2=wife has somewhat more say,3=equal say,4=husband has somewhat more say,5=husband has much more say.
7 This observation of a surprisingly high number of partners who state that they have equal say, corresponds well with descriptive evidence for Denmark, which, however, grants women a much higher social status, by Browning and Bohnke (2006) . They use an expenditure survey which collects direct information on the allocation of all expenditures within the household, and find that the partners' sharing ratio is on average about 50:50. However, they also find considerable dispersion across households.
on average more say than women. In about 30 respectively 28% of couples, the man has more say, according to the husband's respectively wife's assessment. 100.00 1=Wife has much more say, 2=Wife has somewhat more say, 3=Equal say, 4=Husband has somewhat more say, 5=Husband has much more say Our measure is subjective and might be measured with some error, as husband and wife might give different answers on how decision power is distributed among them. Table 3 illustrates agreements and disagreements of partners by taking the absolute value of the difference between assessments. More than 57 per cent of couples agree perfectly in their assessments and 79 per cent agree perfectly or almost perfectly. Strong disagreements, i.e. situations in which both partners think they (or their partner) have (much) more decision power, are seldom, and occur only in 3.5% of the cases. A closer look at these disagreement cases reveals that usually men assess themselves to have somewhat or much more say than their partner, while the female assessment attributes less say to the husband. We acknowledge these differences in partners' assessments as differences in the perceived distribution of power within the household. We view them as the result of gender-specific reporting styles that have been documented for other self-reports as well (Lee and Waite 2005) . Hence, the analysis in the remainder of the paper will be carried out for male and female assessments separately.
Methodology
In our analysis of the determinants of decision power, we include a rich set of individual and household characteristics and we want to allow for maximal flexibility in the interaction of husbands' and wives' characteristics in determining the balance of power within the household. Therefore, we estimate an ordered response model featuring two indices: one index containing the individual characteristics of the husband, and one containing those of the wife. Common characteristics enter both indices. The estimation is then carried out using a semiparametric maximum likelihood estimator. Rather than focussing on its conditional expectation function, our econometric strategy accounts for the ordinal nature of the dependent variable and allows us to recover the respective probabilities for each possible outcome. Consider two known, consecutive values j − 1 and j with j ∈ {1, 2, ..., 5} of the self-reported decision power variable Y i . We then analyze conditional probabilities of events of the form
which can be equivalently written as into the conditional probability of event I. Given (4), the conditional probabilities of events of the form I = {Y i = j} , j ∈ {1, 2, ..., 5} can be straightforwardly analyzed by estimating the probabilities of two binary events of the form {Y i > j} , j ∈ {0, 1, ..., 5}. The quasi-likelihood for a corresponding ordered response model can be constructed as
We apply the approach of Klein and Spady (1993) to construct a semiparametric quasi-likelihood which we maximize to estimate the index parameters β
Given these estimates, we can present bivariate probability plots for different allocations of decision power to see how these vary by each partner's level of empowerment. In addition, we can also compute estimates of partial effects to assess the impact of specific demographic, socioeconomic, and health characteristics on the distribution of within family decision power. Further details on the estimation procedure as well as computation of the partial mean estimates can be found in the appendix. The characteristics included in each index are: age and age squared, household wealth and household wealth squared, individual income and income squared, years of education, work status, dummy variables capturing the existence of mobility limitations, any problems with activities of daily living (ADLs) or instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs). ADLs are activities related to personal care and include bathing, showering, dressing, getting in or out of bed or a chair, using the toilet and eating, while IADLs relate to independent living and include preparing meals, shopping for groceries or personal items, performing housework, and using a telephone. Finally, the indices include two dummies classifying the urbanity of the area in which the household is situated.
Results
This section describes the results in two steps: First, we relate the two indices to the outcome variable, distribution of say in the household (Section 5.1). Ex ante, theses indices do not have an economic interpretation any more. They represent a nonlinear combination of the husband's or wife's characteristics. We will argue that these indices can ex post be interpreted as "empowerment indices" of the partners. Linking the indices to the outcome variable illustrates the benefits of our estimation technique quite ostensively: it shows the highly complex interactions between husband's and wife's characteristics in determining their respective decision weight. Empirical studies based on a parametric approach do not account for these nonlinearities. In the second step, we relate the individual characteristics to the decision power of the partners directly. We discover some new regularities which will be described in detail in Section 5.2.
The link function between the two indices and decision power
In order to get an idea of the combinations of male and female index values that appear most frequently in the data, Figure 1a shows the bivariate density estimates for the two indices. The red curves depict the areas of highest densities, i. Figure 1a . Figure 1b shows the link between the index value combinations and the probability that the woman has much more say in the household. The red area depicts index combinations that render the woman most likely to be decisive. Blue defines a lower probability and black the lowest probability area. The woman is most likely to have much more say if she has a high index value and her husband has a low index, and vice versa. The relationship between indices and outcome looks pretty linear. A slightly less robust, but similar picture is given by Figure 1c . The relationship between the indices and the likelihood that the woman has somewhat more say is relatively linear as well and a high-low combination increases her likelihood to have more decision power than her husband. In Figure 1d , the picture changes substantially. While one might expect a linear link, namely that similar index values of the spouses increase the likelihood of equal say, we do not find evidence for this hypothesis. Rather, we find that equal say is most likely for low-low and high-high combinations of male and female indices (depicted in red), but less likely for combinations where both partners have medium index values. Furthermore, the likelihood is lowest not for the most extreme dispersion of male and female values, but for a small range of value combinations, where the husband has a medium high index value between 0.38 and 0.45 and his spouse has a very low index between 0.26 and 0.32. Hence, for equal say which is the most frequent outcome in the data, we find a highly nonlinear link between the indices which comprise all individual characteristics of the partners, and the partner distribution of decision power. Figure 1e shows a slightly weaker pattern, but generally, the probability that the man has somewhat more say, is positively associated with medium to high male index values and low to medium female index values. Finally, the probability that the man has much more say in the household is highest if the husband has a medium high index value between 0.38 and 0.46 and his spouse has a very low index between 0.26 and 0.32. This is the counterpart effect of the low probability (black) area in Figure 1d . Generally, the probability of having much more say is higher for the husband if his index value is substantially larger than that of his wife. If we now look at the link between indices and say in the household according to the female assessments (Fig. 2) , the results look slightly less clear-cut, but similar. One difference is worth pointing out: The probability of equal say is highest for high-high and medium-high combinations of female and male indices, but not for low-low combinations who are most likely to give the man somewhat more say. This result shows that women have to have a high level of empowerment and a good relative position versus their husbands to feel decisive in household decisions. These differences in valuation between men and women may be due to a generally disadvantaged, but changing social status of women which makes women feel "that they have to be better than men to get equal rights" and which make men more perceptive of the relative difference in their characteristics. In summary, the outcome probabilities conditional on the two estimated index functions exhibit a highly nonlinear profile and point to some complex and surprising interactions of husband's and wife's characteristics. Now, we turn to the discussion of the characteristics contained in the respective indices, and their relation to the balance of power within the household.
Determinants of decision power
As explained in Section 4, the two indices contain the individual and common characteristics of the husband respectively the wife. Hence, we can now investigate which individual or household characteristics are the driving forces of his or her decision power. Table 5 gives the parameter estimates for the socioeconomic characteristics for the male assessments. The parameter estimates are not interpretable in a linear fashion, hence this table mainly serves to illustrate the significance of the estimates. Nearly all parameters are highly significant at the 1% level, except for squared household wealth, squared income, and the dummies for mobility limitations, and IADLs (ADLS) in the male index which are significant at the 5% (10%) level. The only characteristics for which we do not find any significant effect are squared income, the dummies for ADLs and IADLs, and a medium city size in the female index. none to ADL, IADL, 0,0,0 to 1,1,1 0,0,0 to 1,1,1 mobility limit. Household Wealth 2nd to 8th decile 88,520 to 665,000 City size urban to rural area >100,000 to <2,500 inhab.
The magnitudes of the estimated effects can better be gathered from Table  6 which contains the estimated average partial effects as changes in the probabilities of the five values for the distribution of decision power. The reason for reporting changes in absolute and relative terms is the relatively high concentra-tion of answers at the value 3 ("equal say") which leads to only small absolute changes in probabilities. The relative changes, on contrary, might give an overly drastic picture of the magnitude of effects, so we report both. These numbers are calculated keeping all individual characteristics at their actual levels and varying only the variable of interest from a low to a high value, defined in Table 4 . The first two columns in Table 6 with the header "men" contain the probability changes if only the man's characteristics are changed. The next two columns report the impact of changes of the wife's characteristics, while the characteristics of both partners are changed simultaneously in the last two columns. The table indicates that own decision power increases with own age, own income, own education, and own labor force participation. Hence, while a comparison of the magnitude of these effects shows that women's characteristics have a stronger influence on decision power than men's, its qualitative nature looks symmetric for men and women. One outstanding feature should be pointed out: The most important driving factor in strengthening female decision power is her education. It raises the probability that she has much more say than him in the household by 85%, while a high education of both partners increases this probability only by 27%. This symmetry of qualitative results vanishes when looking at health status. We have summarized our three dummies reflecting mobility limitations, ADLS and IADLS, into one composite measure. If the man suffers from a bad health status, his decision power is likely to be much lower than that of a healthy man, while illness in women des not seem to have any sizeable effect on her decision power. For example, the probability that the wife has much more say in the household rises by 145%, if the husband has a bad health status. Vice versa, a bad health status of the spouse barely reduces her decision weight at all. Finally, we report the household-specific characteristics for both partners only, as we cannot vary them individually. The effect of household wealth is not particularly large, and, as we saw in Table 5 , not very robust. For city size, we find that living in an rural area hampers female decision power to a sizeable extent. Living in small communities makes it unlikely that she has more say than her husband, and somewhat more likely to live in a very patriarchic household. 
------------16.11 2.42 The absolute change in probabilities is the percentage point change, the relative one is the percentage change. ------------28.78 3.27 The absolute change in probabilities is the percentage point change, the relative one is the percentage change.
6 Conclusions "Women's empowerment is the process by which women gain greater control over the circumstances of their lives." (Kishor and Subiya 2005) . Empowerment is not only reflected by higher participation of women in political processes and managerial jobs, but also in the degree to which they can influence decisions taken in their families. For this reason and for the design of targeted transfers as well as for a better understanding of household decision-making in general, it is important to advance the knowledge about the determinants of the balance of power in households. Based on the Mexican Health and Aging Study, we exploit a unique direct measure of the distribution of decision power within the household. Our findings can be categorized into five main results: First, we advocate a new measure of the balance of decision power within households which is based on self-assessments of overall say in important family decisions. We argue that its generality allows the identification of the balance of power and does not intertwine preferences and decision power as questions on say in more specific decision situations do. Second, we find highly complex interactions between the spouses' characteristics in determining decision power that cannot be replicated in a simple parametric framework. This result emphasizes the usefulness of the semiparametric approach of a double-index model in this kind of applications. Third, a driving force of decision power among older Mexican couples is education. This is a well-known result in the literature and has also been recognized by politicians who have introduced programs that foster the education of children, especially girls. One of these programs is the widely recognized and well researched PROGRESA. We show a large asymmetry in the effect of male and female education on decision power. While a higher education level increases the husband's decision power only moderately, the increase is large if the wife has a high educational level. Fourth, a new determinant of decision power within older households is health status which again has a strongly asymmetric effect on decision power. Illness of the spouse does not reduce her decision power significantly. On the contrary, it reduces his decision power substantially if he suffers from bad health, i.e. has problems with activities of daily living and/or mobility limitations. Fifth, we find some effects of the social environment in that decision power of women is generally lower in rural areas than in the cities. In summary, male and female characteristics interact in a complex fashion in determining the balance of power within the household. The same characteristic does not necessarily have the same quantitative or qualitative effect in shifting the balance of power depending on whether it is attributed to the husband or the wife. Hence, the determinants are gender-specific and it is neither simple absolute levels nor simple differences that capture the complexity of the interactions.
where the estimated probabilities P (·) are computed following the approach in A1.2.
